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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DENNIS P. GLICK, 
Petitioner and Appellee, 
v. 
M. TAMARA HOLDEN, Warden 
Southpoint Complex 
Utah State Prison, 
Respondent and Appellant. 
Priority No. 15 
Case No. 940004-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal arises from the trial court's grant of Glick's 
request for relief in his petition for extraordinary writ, Glick 
is an inmate transferred from Arkansas pursuant to the Interstate 
Corrections Compact (ICC). He is not challenging his conditions of 
confinement, not his conviction or sentence; therefore, this Court 
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (g) (Supp. 
1993). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does the ICC require the Utah State Prison to apply 
Arkansas' disciplinary, classification, visitation, and grooming 
policies when dealing with Glick? 
1 
2. Does the order of the United States District Court for 
the District of Utah, issued May 19, 1993, dismissing the same 
claim raised in the instant petition require this petition's 
dismissal on the basis of res judicata? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing the trial court's decision to grant a motion for 
summary judgment, this Court views "the facts and all reasonable 
inferences in a light most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion.11 Neiderhauser Builders and Development Corp. v. Campbell, 
824 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah App. 1992). However, this Court reviews 
the trial court's conclusions of law for correctness. 
Neiderhauser, 824 P.2d at 1196. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES 
No constitutional provisions or rules appear to be relevant to 
this matter. The only relevant statute, Utah Code Ann. § 77-28a-l 
(1990), the codification of the ICC, is attached as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal arises from the trial court's grant of Glick's 
motion for summary judgment and the denial of respondent's motion 
for summary judgment. After this oral decision, respondent filed 
a motion to vacate the order, which the trial court also denied. 
The court, however, granted respondent's motion to stay execution 
of the judgment pending appeal. The trial court signed the final 
order on November 22, 1993 and respondent filed her Notice of 
Appeal on December 22, 1993. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Glick initially filed this petition on March 31, 1992. He 
claims that, because he is an inmate transferred from Arkansas 
pursuant to the Interstate Corrections Compact (ICC), Utah is 
obligated to use Arkansas' policies and procedures in managing him. 
(R. at 2). On July 6, 1992, the trial court dismissed the action 
due to Glick's failure to attach documents required by rule 65B, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. at 15). A few months later, 
based upon Glick's motion for a new trial, the court vacated the 
order of dismissal and ordered respondent to file an answer. (R. 
at 44) . At the same time, the court appointed Glick pro bono 
counsel. Id. 
Respondent answered the petition and, shortly thereafter, 
filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the ICC did 
not require Utah to apply Arkansas' policies and procedures to 
Glick while he was incarcerated at the Utah State Prison. In the 
memorandum supporting summary judgment, respondent also attached a 
copy of the contract between Arkansas and Utah specifically giving 
Utah disciplinary authority over Glick. (R. at 71-76). In 
response, Glick also filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging 
that the ICC affirmatively required Utah's obeisance to Arkansas 
prison regulations. 
After a hearing on the motions, the trial court granted 
Glick's motion for summary judgment, concluding that under the ICC 
Utah acted merely as an agent for Arkansas and, therefore, Utah had 
3 
to apply Arkansas' visitation, grooming, and classification 
policies. Additionally, the trial court ruled that Utah had to 
either: (1) reconvene the disciplinary proceedings to which Glick 
had been subjected while at the prison and hold them according to 
Arkansas' rules; (2) send the evidence used in the disciplinary 
proceedings to Arkansas' officials for a decision; or (3) record or 
transcribe the disciplinary hearing and send it to Arkansas' 
officials for their concurrence in the result,1 (R. at 288-290). 
Within a few days of the court's oral decision but before the 
written order was entered, respondent's attorney learned that Glick 
had previously filed a complaint in the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah claiming, among other things, that 
Utah was required to apply Arkansas' policies and procedures. (R. 
at 191; Glick v. Steward, Case No. 93-C-071W, United States 
District Court, District of Utah, filed March 30, 1993; Addendum 
B). 
1
 Though not particularly relevant due to the resolution of 
this case at the trial court level, it is important to understand 
the particular disciplinary violation that immediately led to 
Glick's petition. Apparently Glick had destroyed his prison ID 
card. The prison mailroom found Glick's photo in an outgoing 
letter. Glick admitted that he had cut the photo out of the ID 
card, (R. at 33), but he argued that he did not know such conduct 
was a violation of prison rules because he was from Arkansas. Id. 
The prison disciplinary officer accepted this excuse and 
reduced the severity of the violation from a major disciplinary 
infraction to a minor, id. Glick actually received no punishment 
because he already had paid for a new ID card. Id. Glick's 
conduct also violates Arkansas' disciplinary rules as well as 
Utah's and would require a similar disposition even in an Arkansas 
prison. (R. at 121-122) . 
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The federal complaint was filed one day before this petition 
was filed in the state trial court. Before Glick filed his motion 
for a new trial to re-commence this state proceeding, United States 
Magistrate Judge Alba had already issued a Report and 
Recommendation in the federal case dismissing the ICC claim as 
frivolous pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1915(d). (R. at 197). Glick had 
received the Report & Recommendation, but never objected to it. On 
May 19, 1993, United States District Court Judge David Winder, 
after a de novo review, approved the Report and Recommendation, and 
dismissed several counts in Glick's complaint. (R. at 205-220; 
Addendum C). In his order, Judge Winder went through a lengthy 
analysis of Arkansas law and the text of the ICC, concluding that 
the interstate agreement did not obligate Utah's prison system to 
apply Arkansas policies and procedures. This conclusion supported 
the respondent's position below. 
Upon finding out about the prior federal case, respondent 
filed a motion to vacate the court's order pursuant to rule 60(b), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion was based not just on 
the existence of the prior complaint, but also on Glick's failure 
to inform the trial court of either the pending adjudication, 
Magistrate Judge Alba's Report and Recommendation, or Judge 
Winder's order. (R. at 185-189). After submission of memoranda by 
both parties and oral argument, the trial court denied the motion 
to vacate, signed Glick's proposed order, and granted respondent's 
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motion to stay execution of the order pending appeal- (R. at 292; 
Addendum D). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Interstate Corrections Compact (ICC) is an agreement among 
various states, including Utah, that facilitates the transfer of an 
inmate from one state to another. The inmate remains subject to 
the sentence for which he was imprisoned in his or her home state 
but is allowed to spend his time elsewhere, usually either to be 
close to family or enjoy programs and opportunities not available 
in his or her home state. 
The trial court's decision requiring Utah to apply Arkansas' 
policies and procedures is incorrect because it misconstrues the 
effect of the agency relationship created by the compact and does 
not comply with the compact's requirement that transferred inmates 
like Glick be treated equally with inmates native to the receiving 
state. The trial court's judgment thwarts the purposes of the ICC 
by creating actual obstacles to interstate transfer, requiring Utah 
to learn and apply not just Arkansas' policies and procedures but, 
by logical extension, the policies and procedures of every state 
from whom Utah has received an inmate under the ICC. 
In the contract between Arkansas and Utah, Arkansas expressly 
delegated to this state disciplinary control and authority over 
compacted inmates like Glick. Under the law of agency, which the 
trial court stated was the purported basis for its decision, the 
agent, in this case Utah, is required to follow the directions of 
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the principal, Arkansas. By directing Utah to maintain discipline 
and control over Arkansas' inmates and to refrain from giving them 
special privileges, Arkansas has directed Utah to apply the same 
policies and procedures on classification, discipline, visitation, 
and grooming as Utah does on its own inmates. 
Additionally, Glick's petition should have been dismissed due 
to the doctrine of res judicata. Glick brought this same issue to 
federal court in 1993 and his claim was thoroughly analyzed and 
dismissed as frivolous by the federal court. Under the legal 
definition of frivolous pertinent to these cases in federal court, 
that dismissal evidenced its opinion that Glick's claim had no 
basis in law or fact. Thus, the federal court action was a 
dismissal on the merits of the claim and should bar this case. Any 
other disposition encourages litigants to roam from court to court, 
searching for a sympathetic judge. This purpose is precisely the 
reason for res judicata and compels application of the doctrine 
here. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ICC DOES NOT IMPOSE ARKANSAS' POLICIES AND 
PROCEDURES ON THE UTAH PRISON SYSTEM; 
THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY GRANTED 
THE REQUESTED RELIEF. 
The purpose of the ICC is to develop and execute "programs of 
cooperation for the confinement, treatment and rehabilitation of 
offenders with the most economical use of human and material 
resources." Utah Code Ann. § 77-28a-l (1990), Article I, 
Interstate Corrections Compact). (Addendum A) . To achieve that 
purpose, however, the ICC must also facilitate inmate transfers, 
or, at least, not create obstacles to them. Article IV of the ICC 
requires that, before an inmate is transferred, he must request it 
in writing.2 The requirement of inmate consent illustrates that 
the underlying rationale for enactment of the ICC was humanitarian: 
to allow inmates the opportunity to serve their sentences closer to 
family members. The record establishes that Glick requested a 
transfer to the Utah prison system precisely for this reason. (R. 
at 4) . Ultimately then, any court ruling that hinders the transfer 
system prejudices an inmate's ability to transfer. 
Because it incorrectly interpreted the ICC, the trial court's 
order frustrates the goals and purposes of the compact. By logical 
extension of the court's reasoning, the prison system is bound to 
follow the policies and procedures of forty-nine other state 
jurisdictions for each particular compacted inmate. This patchwork 
quilt of policies and procedures will create administrative burdens 
that will inevitably deter the Utah prison system from 
participating in the ICC.3 
2
 The Western Interstate Corrections Compact, an agreement 
among the western contiguous states, Hawaii, Alaska, and Guam does 
not require inmate consent. Utah Code Ann. § 77-28-1 (1991) . 
Otherwise, the language of the two compacts is identical. 
3
 In practice, if the Utah prison system has accepted an 
inmate from another state under the compact, Utah has the option, 
which it has exercised in many cases, to send a Utah inmate to that 
jurisdiction, based on the inmate's written request. Therefore, if 
the trial court's decision becomes the norm, and the Utah prison, 
in order to lessen its administrative burdens, starts returning 
those transferred inmates, not only the Utah system, but also the 
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Glick takes several discrete sentences from the compact, takes 
them out of context, and creates an argument for a position, that, 
if followed by Utah courts, would, in all probability, end the 
state's participation in the ICC. However compelling and logical 
that textual argument may seem, when analyzed in the context of the 
ICC and its purposes, the error in the trial court's decision 
becomes manifest. 
In its oral decision granting Glick's motion for summary 
judgment, the trial court stated its opinion that the ICC required 
application of Arkansas' rules because it is "reasonably clear and 
unambiguous that the receiving state acts in the capacity as an 
agent for the sending state." (R. at 331; Tr. Hearing before Hon. 
Kenneth Rigtrup, Glick v. Holden, Case No. 920901737, September 27, 
1993, at 29). 
Although Utah acts as an agent for Arkansas while 
incarcerating Glick, the trial court misconstrues the effect of the 
agency relationship on Utah's power to apply its prison policies 
and procedures while Glick resides here. According to the Second 
Restatement of Agency, an agent "is authorized to do . . . what it 
is reasonable for him to infer that the principal desires him to do 
in the light of the principal's manifestations. ..." Restatement 
(Second) of Agency § 33 (1958) . The manifestation of Arkansas' 
prisons in the other states with which Utah has contracted will be 
disrupted. Ultimately, the ICC will no longer facilitate 
interstate prison transfers and the purposes for which the ICC was 
created will be thwarted. 
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desires, as the principal, is best evidenced by the contract 
entered into by both states in 1978 to implement the ICC. (Addendum 
R). 
In terms of agency, the written contract details the agent's, 
i.e., Utah's, authority^ .and powers over Glick and its relationship 
with Arkansas. According to agency law, Utah is bound to obey 
Arkansas' directives. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 14 cmt. 
a (1958) ("[T]he agent is subject to a duty not to act contrary to 
the principal's directions."). 
In the contract, Arkansas directs Utah to "maintain proper 
discipline and control" over Arkansas inmates and "to make certain 
that they receive no special privileges. (R. 80; Addendum E) . 
More important, Arkansas expressly permits Utah to exercise 
disciplinary authority over its compacted inmates and subjects 
those inmates to Utah law and regulations. (R. 82; Addendum E). 
At the same time however, the contract forbids the Utah prison 
from imposing any type of discipline prohibited by Arkansas.4 Id. 
Arkansas does not allow corporal punishment, R. at 122, and neither 
does Utah, R. at 170. 
4
 Under principles of statutory construction, this lone 
exception to the broad grant of disciplinary authority implies that 
there are no other exceptions. In accordance with the axiom 
"expressio unius est expressio alterius" when a contract or statute 
contains specific exceptions, it is inferred that the drafter of 
the instrument did not intend other exceptions. Sutherland's 
Statutory Construction, § 47.23 (5th ed. 1992). 
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The trial court apparently assumed that the agency 
relationship required Utah to become Arkansas' alter ego, acting 
essentially as the western branch of the Arkansas prison system. 
Neither the ICC, the contract, nor agency law, allows such a 
significant intrusion into a receiving state's correctional system. 
Indeed, this interpretation conflicts with a fundamental 
commandment of the ICC: that all inmates be treated equally with 
inmates native to the receiving state. Utah Code Ann. § 77-28a-l, 
Article IV, Interstate Corrections Compact. The logic behind the 
ICC's injunction that all inmates be treated equally is plain: it 
would be administratively unworkable for a prison system to have to 
adopt the policies and procedures of another state when it accepted 
that state's inmates.5 
Glick also bases his argument on language in the ICC regarding 
the "legal rights" of the compacted inmate and the obligation that 
a hearing required by Arkansas law be held in accordance with that 
state's law. As discussed thoroughly in Judge Winder's order, 
these provisions do not compel application of Arkansas' policies 
and procedures because Arkansas law does not give inmates, even in 
Arkansas prisons, any "legal right" to a particular classification. 
(R. at 215) . Additionally, Arkansas law does not give Glick a 
5
 If this were required, it leaves numerous questions 
unanswered: Would Arkansas' constitution apply when determining 
the amount of due process that need be given the inmate? Would 
court cases regarding the conditions of confinement in Arkansas 
prisons apply to the Utah institution in which Glick is housed? 
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legal right to a particular disciplinary procedure, a specific 
number of visitors, or grooming standards. (R. at 216). 
In Strickland v. Dver. 628 F.Supp. 180, 181 (E.D. Ark. 1986), 
the federal district court stated that Arkansas law did not protect 
an inmate's right to a particular classification. This conclusion 
is the same as that contained in Moodv v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78 
(1976), which held that the federal constitution did not protect an 
inmate's classification. Thus, Glick has no legal right to the 
substantive classification given either by Arkansas authorities or 
by Utah authorities. 
Neither does Arkansas give Glick a legal right either to a 
particular disciplinary procedure or result (other than the 
prohibition on types of discipline not allowed in Arkansas). 
Arkansas law gives the director of the Department of Corrections 
the mandate to develop rules and regulations "for the maintenance 
of good order and discipline in the facilities and institutions of 
the department, including proceedings for dealing with violations." 
Ark. Code Ann. § 12-29-103 (1987). By specifically directing Utah 
to apply its own policies and procedures in reference to Glick, the 
Arkansas Department of Corrections has developed rules and 
regulations for inmates, like Glick, who are compacted to other 
states, i.e., the disciplinary policy and procedure of the 
receiving state. 
To interpret the ICC properly, the requirement to treat all 
inmates equally must be accorded controlling weight. When looked 
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at in this fashion, the contractual provisions regarding special 
privileges and the exercise of disciplinary authority make sense. 
Because the ICC requires equality in treatment, the receiving state 
must apply its disciplinary, classification, visitation, and 
grooming policies. Otherwise, the compacted inmate is being given 
special privileges and the ICC is violated. The trial court's 
order compels that violation. 
This conclusion is supported by the only two cases in the 
country that have discussed this issue. In Stewart v. McManus, 924 
F.2d 138, 141-42 (8th Cir. 1991), the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that a Kansas prisoner housed in an Iowa prison 
pursuant to the compact was not entitled to application of Kansas' 
policies and procedures. As the respondent argued in this matter, 
the Stewart court relied both on the ICC's injunction to treat all 
prisoners equally and on a contractual provision giving the 
receiving state disciplinary control and authority over the 
compacted inmate. Id. The Iowa Supreme Court reached the same 
result in Cranford v. State. 471 N.W.2d 904, 905-906 (Iowa 1991) 
and even adopted the Stewart analysis regarding the need for equal 
treatment and the contractual provision regarding discipline. 
II. BECAUSE 6LICK HAD RECEIVED AN ADVERSE RULING 
ON THE SAME ISSUE PROM FEDERAL COURT, THE 
DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA PROHIBITS HIM FROM 
RAISING THE SAME ISSUE IN THE INSTANT 
LITIGATION. 
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Fundamentally, the doctrine of res judicata bars a person from 
constantly re-litigating issues that have previously been 
adjudicated. State v. Sims. 239 Utah Adv. Rep. 60, 61 (Utah, May 
31, 1994). As stated in Sims, res judicata applies when there has 
been a prior adjudication of a factual issue and the application of 
a rule of law. Id. As pointed out to the trial court, Glick made 
the same claim, and raised precisely the same issue, in his federal 
case before Judge Winder. (R. 191-196). Both Magistrate Judge 
Alba and Judge Winder found that several counts in Glick's 
complaint were frivolous and should be dismissed pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1915(d). Ld. Section 1915 establishes a procedure by 
which an indigent person can file a civil or criminal action in 
federal court by filing, in good faith, an affidavit stating that 
he is unable to pay costs. 
To screen out frivolous lawsuits, subsection 1915(d) allows a 
court to dismiss complaints sua sponte prior to service of the 
complaint upon defendants. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 3245 
(1988). In Neitzke, the Court ruled that to justify dismissal 
under this provision, the complaint's failure to state a claim 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is 
insufficient.6 Id. at 327. Instead, subsection 1915(d) created 
6
 As a result of Nietzke, the legal definitions of 
"frivolous" and "failure to state a claim" are independent of each 
other though they may overlap in practice. To express the concept 
in formulaic terms: all complaints properly dismissed as frivolous 
under section 1915(d) would also be subject to dismissal under rule 
12(b)(6), but not all complaints subject to rule 12(b)(6) would 
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a more rigorous standard, i.e., that the complaint must lack any 
"arguable basis in law or fact." JCd. at 325. When understood in 
its proper procedural context, it becomes even more apparent that 
the prior federal court decision disposed of the merits of Glick's 
claim and found them lacking even an arguable basis in law or fact. 
Therefore, Judge Winder's order, issued four months before the 
oral argument and decision in this case bars Glick's petition as 
res judicata. Glick attempts to distinguish the two cases by 
stating that Judge Winder's decision concerned only whether the 
purported violation of the ICC created a cause of action under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 and that this case instead concerned the 
interpretation of the ICC without regard to federal civil rights 
law. 
Although it is true that Judge Winder ultimately focused on 
Glick's inability to successfully plead a cause of action under § 
1983, in doing so, he also concluded that the ICC did not impose 
Arkansas' policies and procedures on Utah. (R. at 211-216). 
Indeed, the federal court specifically avoided resolving the basic 
question of whether a violation of the ICC can result in a civil 
rights action by concluding instead that "the ICC does not grant 
prisoners a right to maintain a particular prisoner classification 
properly be subject to dismissal as frivolous. In effect, this 
ruling increases the number of section 1915 actions that are served 
and later resolved at the motion to dismiss stage. 
15 
or to have ADOC [Arkansas] officials conduct hearings for 
violations of UDOC [Utah] disciplinary process." (R. 212).7 
By the time the trial court had ordered the state to respond 
to Glick's petition, he already had received an adverse ruling from 
the federal court, Glick failed to object to Magistrate Judge 
Alba's Report and Recommendation and also did not appeal Judge 
Winder's order. The issue was adjudicated and decided and res 
judicata prevents Glick from trying for a different ruling on the 
same issue in another court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, respondent respectfully requests 
that this Court reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand 
the case with instructions that the trial court enter summary 
judgment in favor of respondent. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS ?^ / ^ dav of June 1994. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
James H. Beadles 
Assistant Attorney General 
7
 By resolving the case in this fashion, the federal court 
successfully avoided having to decide whether Congress has 
transformed the ICC into federal law, which would allow a civil 
rights action to be brought for its violation. (R. at 211-212). 
The federal courts of appeal have split on this issue. Id. 
16 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
CHAPTER 28a 
INTERSTATE CORRECTIONS COMPACT 
Section 
77-28a-l. Compact entered into law - Text of compact. 
77-28a-2. Department of Corrections - Authority to transfer 
inmates. 
77-28a-3. Duties and powers of courts, departments, agencies 
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77-28a-l. Compact entered into law - Text of compact. 
The interstate compact on corrections as contained herein is 
enacted into law and entered into on behalf of this state with any 
and all other states legally joining therein in a form 
substantially as follows: 
INTERSTATE CORRECTIONS COMPACT 
ARTICLE I 
PURPOSE AND POLICY 
The party states, desiring by common action to fully utilize 
and improve their institutional facilities and provide adequate 
programs for the confinement, treatment and rehabilitation of 
various types of offenders, declare that it is the policy of each 
of the party states to provide such facilities and programs on a 
basis of co-operation with one another, thereby serving the best 
interests of such offenders and of society and effecting economies 
in capital expenditures and operational costs. The purpose of this 
Compact is to provide for the mutual development and execution of 
such programs of co-operation for the confinement, treatment and 
rehabilitation of offenders with the most economical use of human 
and material resources. 
ARTICLE II 
DEFINITIONS 
As used in this Compact, unless the context clearly requires 
otherwise: 
(a) "State" means a state of the United States, the United 
States of America, a Territory or possession of the United States, 
the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; 
(b) "Sending state" means a state party to this Compact in 
which conviction or court commitment was had; 
(c) "Receiving state" means a state party to this Compact to 
which an inmate is sent for confinement other than a state in which 
(d) "Inmate" means a male or female offender who is 
committed, under sentence to or confined in a penal or correctional 
institution; 
(e) "Institution" means any penal or correctional facility, 
including but not limited to a facility for the mentally ill or 
mentally defective, in which inmates as defined in (d) above may 
lawfully be confined. 
ARTICLE III 
CONTRACTS 
(a) Each party state may make one or more contracts with any 
one or more of the other party states for the confinement of 
inmates on behalf of a sending state in institutions situated 
within receiving states. Any such contract shall provide for: 
(1) Its duration; 
(2) Payments to be made to the receiving state by the sending 
state for inmate maintenance, extraordinary medical and dental 
expenses, and any participation in or receipt by inmates of 
rehabilative or correctional services, facilities, programs or 
treatment not reasonably included as part of normal maintenance; 
(3) Participation in programs of inmate employment, if any, 
the disposition or crediting of any payments received by inmates on 
account thereof, and the crediting of proceeds from or disposal of 
any products resulting therefrom; 
(4) Delivery and retaking of inmates; 
(5) Such other matters as may be necessary and appropriate to 
fix the obligations, responsibilities and rights of the sending and 
receiving states. 
(b) The terms and provisions of this Compact shall be a part 
of any contract entered into by the authority of or pursuant 
thereto, and nothing in any such contract shall be inconsistent 
therewith. 
ARTICLE IV 
PROCEDURES AND RIGHTS 
(a) Whenever the duly constituted authorities in a state party 
to this Compact, and which has entered into a contract pursuant to 
Article III, shall decide that confinement in, or transfer of an 
inmate to, an institution within the territory of another party 
state is necessary or desirable in order to provide adequate 
quarters and care of an appropriate program of rehabilitation or 
treatment, said officials may direct that the confinement be within 
an institution with the territory of said other party state, the 
receiving state to act in that regard solely as agent for the 
sending state. 
(b) The appropriate officials of any state party to this 
Compact shall have access, at all reasonable times, to any 
institution in which it has a contractual right to confine inmates 
for the purpose of inspecting the facilities thereof and visiting 
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such of its inmates as may be confined in the institution* 
(c) Inmates confined in an institution pursuant to the terms 
of this Compact shall at all times be subject to the jurisdiction 
of the sending state and may at any time be removed therefrom for 
transfer to a prison or other institution within the sending state, 
for transfer to another institution in which the sending state may 
have a contractual or other right to confine inmates, for release 
on probation or parole, for discharge, or for any other purpose 
permitted by the laws of the sending state; provided, that the 
sending state shall continue to be obligated to such payments as 
may be required pursuant to the terms of any contract entered into 
under the terms of Article III. 
(d) Each receiving state shall provide regular reports to each 
sending state on the inmates of that sending state in institutions 
pursuant to this Compact including a conduct record of each inmate 
and certify said record to the official designated by the sending 
state, in order that each inmate may have official review of his or 
her record in determining and altering the disposition of said 
inmate in accordance with the law which may obtain in the sending 
state and in order that the same may be a source of information for 
the sending state. 
(e) All inmates who may be confined in an institution pursuant 
to the provisions of this Compact shall be treated in a reasonable 
and humane manner and shall be treated equally with such similar 
inmates of the receiving state as may be confined in the same 
institution. The fact of confinement in a receiving state shall not 
deprive any inmate so confined of any legal rights which said 
inmate would have had if confined in an appropriate institution of 
the sending state. 
(f) Any hearing or hearings to which an inmate confined 
pursuant to this Compact may be entitled by the laws of the sending 
state may be had before the appropriate authorities of the sending 
state, or of the receiving state, if authorized by the sending 
state. The receiving state shall provide adequate facilities for 
such hearings as may be conducted by the appropriate officials of 
a sending state. In the event such hearing or hearings are had 
before officials of the receiving state, the governing law shall be 
that of the sending state and a record of the hearing or hearings 
as prescribed by the sending state shall be made. Said record 
together with any recommendations of the hearing officials shall be 
transmitted forthwith to the official or officials before whom the 
hearing would have been had if it had taken place in the sending 
state. In any and all proceedings had pursuant to the provisions of 
this subdivision, the officials of the receiving state shall act 
solely as agents of the sending state and no final determination 
shall be made in any matter except by the appropriate officials of 
the sending state. 
(g) Any inmate confined pursuant to this Compact shall be 
released within the territory of the sending state unless the 
inmate, and the sending and receiving states, shall agree upon 
release in some other place. The sending state shall bear the cost 
« 
of such return to its territory. 
(h) Any inmate confined pursuant to the terms of this Compact 
shall have any and all rights to participate in and derive any 
benefits or incur or be relieved of any obligations or have such 
obligations modified or his status changed on account of any action 
or proceeding in which he could have participated if confined in 
any appropriate institution of the sending state located within 
such state. 
(i) The parent, guardian, trustee, or other person or persons 
entitled under the laws of the sending state to act for, advise, or 
otherwise function with respect to any inmate shall not be deprived 
of or restricted in his. exercise of any powers in respect of any 
inmate confined pursuant to the terms of this Compact. 
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ARTICLE V 
ACTS NOT REVIEWABLE IN RECEIVING STATE: EXTRADITION 
(a) Any decision of the sending state in respect of any matter 
over which it retains jurisdiction pursuant to this Compact shall 
be conclusive upon and not reviewable within the receiving state, 
but if at the time the sending state seeks to remove an inmate from 
an institution in the receiving state there is pending against the 
inmate within such state any criminal charge or if the inmate is 
formally accused of having committed within such state a criminal 
offense, the inmate shall not be returned without the consent of 
the receiving state until discharged from prosecution or other form 
of proceeding, imprisonment or detention for such offense. The duly 
accredited officers of the sending state shall be permitted to 
transport inmates pursuant to this Compact through any and all 
states party to this Compact without interference. 
(b) An inmate who escapes from an institution in which he is 
confined pursuant to this Compact shall be deemed a fugitive from 
the sending state and from the state in which the institution is 
situated. In the case of an escape to a jurisdiction other than the 
sending or receiving state, the responsibility for institution of 
extradition or rendition proceedings shall be that of the sending 
state, but nothing contained herein shall be construed to prevent 
or affect the activities of officers and agencies of any 
jurisdiction directed toward the apprehension and return of an 
escapee. 
ARTICLE VI 
FEDERAL AID 
Any state party to this Compact may accept federal aid for use 
in connection with any institution or program, the use of which is 
or may be affected by this Compact or any contract pursuant hereto 
and any inmate in a receiving state pursuant to this Compact may 
participate in any such federally aided program or activity for 
which the sending and receiving states have made contractual 
provision; provided, that if such program or activity is not part 
of the customary correctional regimen the express consent of the 
appropriate official of the sending state shall be required 
therefor. 
ARTICLE VII 
ENTRY INTO FORCE 
This Compact shall enter into force and become effective and 
binding upon the states so acting when it has been enacted into law 
by any two states. Thereafter, this Compact shall enter into force 
and become effective and binding as to any other of said states 
upon similar action by such state. 
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ARTICLE VIII 
WITHDRAWAL AND TERMINATION 
This Compact shall continue in force and remain binding upon a 
party state until it shall have enacted a statute repealing the 
same and providing for the sending of formal written notice of 
withdrawal from the Compact to the appropriate officials of all 
other party states. An actual withdrawal shall not take effect 
until one year after the notices provided in said statute have been 
sent. Such withdrawal shall not relieve the withdrawing state from 
its obligations assumed hereunder prior to the effective date of 
withdrawal. Before the effective date of withdrawal, a withdrawing 
state shall remove to its territory, at its own expense, such 
inmates as it may have confined pursuant to the provisions of this 
Compact. 
ARTICLE IX 
OTHER ARRANGEMENTS UNAFFECTED 
Nothing contained in this Compact shall be construed to 
abrogate or impair any agreement or other arrangement which a party 
state may have with a non-party state for the confinement, 
rehabilitation or treatment of inmates nor to repeal any other laws 
of a party state authorizing the making of co-operative 
institutional arrangements. 
ARTICLE X 
CONSTRUCTION AND SEVERABILITY 
The provisions of this Compact shall be liberally construed and 
shall be severable. If any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of 
this Compact is declared to be contrary to the constitution of any 
participating state or of the United States or the applicability 
thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance is held 
invalid, the validity of the remainder of this Compact and the 
applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or 
circumstance shall not be affected thereby. If this Compact shall 
be held contrary to the constitution of any state participating 
therein, the Compact shall remain in full force and effect as to 
the remaining states and in full force and effect as to the state 
affected as to all severable matters. 
ARTICLE XI 
An inmate must request a transfer in writing before such a 
transfer can be made pursuant to Article IV. 
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ADDENDUM B 
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Dennis P. Glick 
U.S.P. #21016, (A.D.C. #86895) 
\5tah S t a t e P r i s o n , Oquirrh 111 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL PlSTRICT 
IN AND TOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Dennis P. Glick 
Vs. 
Petitioner 
c». ».. Z?/?f/?/7l7 CU 
M. Tamara Holden, Warden 
Southpoint Complex , 
Ltah State Prison £i£E KEKHEffl M ® L « „ t 
Petition For Writ Of Mandamus 
Comes the Petitioner, Dennis P. Glick, to petition this 
court for a writ of mandamus, pursuant to Rule fc5B(b) of the 
Ltah Rules of Civil Procedure, with jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Judicial Code, Sec. 78-35-9. For his cause of action, 
Petitioner states: 
1. Petitioner is in custody of the Utah State Prison, by the 
Respondent, M. Tamara Holden, Warden of the Southpoint Complex, 
P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020, pursuant to the Interstate 
Corrections Compact, as of October 21, 1991, from the Arkansas 
Department of Correction (A.D.C.). 
2. Upon arrival at the Utah State Prison, and completion of 
classification, Petitioner was assessed under the Utah Prison/ 
Parole time matrix system, a total security score of 26 points, 
classifying him C (security score) 3 (custody level) K (behavior 
classification) by classification review officer Scott Carver, 
on November 25, 1991. 
n r r, P 9 
3. On November 29, 1991, Petitioner submitted a classification 
challenge form. This was responded to by Classification Coordinator 
Colleen Gabbitas, on December 6f 1991, advising Petitioner that 
he should not challenge until he receives his copy of the 
assessment. Upon receiving the assissment, Petitioner resubmitted 
his classification challenge to lis . Gabbitas, with a copy 
indicated being forwarded to Respondent Holden, dated December 26, 
1991. Therein, Petitioner cited pertinent parts of the Utah Code 
on Interstate Corrections Compact, indicating that he shoold be 
classified in Utah with the equivalency of his A.D.C. classification, 
with Utah Level 5, road crew worker. Petitioner was a class-one 
trustee working outside the prison compound prior to his transfer 
to Utah. 
A. Petitioner again corresponded with Respondent Holden on 
January 13, 1992. Therein, making mention of the 12-26-91 
classification challenge, and seeking Level 5, the equivalency 
of his Arkansas status. The second correspondence was responded 
to by Management Processes Coordinator Margaret Peterson, dated 
January 15, 1992, stating that while Petitioner is in the custody 
of the Utah State Department of Correction, he will be managed 
according to Utah policy and procedure. 
5. On January 23, 1992, Petitioner received the return of two 
Utah Correctional Industries Inmate Application For Work forms, 
which were rejected on that date. The first noting that Petitioner 
must be Level 4, for the Meat Processing (job #91-105). The second 
noting that Petitioner must be Level 5, for the road crew worker 
C00C3 
(job #92-001)• The latter being the work equivalent to Petitioner's 
Arkansas prison job assignment. 
6. Petitioner vas informed by Captain John Powers and the unit 
caseworker, Larry Chen, during separate interviews, that Petitioner 
cannot be reassessed for a higher level status, until he has a 
parole date. Petitioner is serving a term of life plus 40 years 
and subject by Arkansas law to appear before an executive clemency 
committee in Arkansas* The Arkansas jurisdiction over Petitioner's 
incarceration was confirmed by the State of Utah Board of Pardon, 
in a letter dated December 5, 1991. A special attention hearing 
was held by the Utah Board of Pardons, noting that the notification 
letter to Petitioner, indicationg a parole hearing date for October 
1994, was sent in error. 
7. Petitioner transferred to Utah to receive visitation, which 
he was unable to receive in Arkansas. However, Petitioner has 
several non-related female visitors approved by Arkansas prison 
officials. Since being in the Utah State Prison, Petitioner 
received two notification of result, or information, dated November 
2, 1991, and November 27, 1991, from Visiting Officer J. Cambell 
and Visiting Officer T. E. P., respectively, stating that Petitioner 
is allowed only one adult female not of immediate family on his 
visiting list. Respondent Holden vas made aware of this by letter, 
dated November 19, 1991, from Petitioner. 
8. On January 7f 1992, Petitioner received a major disciplinary, 
in which a personal letter vith a photo of Petitioner, sealed in 
an addressed shamp-envelope, and mailed, vas confiscated by the 
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mail unit. Petitioner vas charged with B-2-E, deliberate damage 
of state property, as charged by Officer Kerry Galetka (case ii 
3920-0218). A hearing vas held on February 20f 1992. Petitioner 
stated that he vas an interstate compact inmate and subject to 
the jurisdiction of Arkansas for final determination. Petitioner 
vas found guilty and the action taken vas reduced to a minor 
disciplinary, B-4-C, accidental destruction or damage of state 
property. No resitution vas ordered, as Petitioner had already 
purchased a new l.D. card prior to the notification of the 
pending disciplinary action. Appeal of the disciplinary vas taken 
on February 28, 1992, seeking that the disciplinary be expunged 
from his institutional record, since proper procedure vas not 
followed. No result of that action as of the date of this action. 
9. On February 14, 1992, Petitioner corresponded \:ith the mail 
unit officer, Kerry Galetha, seeking the return of his letter and 
stamp envelope taken as evidence for the 1-7*92 disciplinary. The 
letter to officer Galetka vas returned to Petitioner, the same 
date, stating that he must contact the evidence officer, Kay 
Sorenson, to retrieve the letter. Petitioner contacted Officer 
Sorenson by letter, dated February 19, 1992, seeking the return 
of the letter and envelope. To this date, Petitioner have not 
retrieved his property. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
10. Petitioner seeks Level 5 and job opportunity equivalent 
to that assign to him in Arkansas, or other job opportunity that 
-4-
Petitioner nay seek. 
11. Petitioner seeks relief from the Utah matrix system, in that 
the point assissment not apply to him* 
12. Petitioner seeks approval of all visitors that have been 
and vould be approved by Arkansas prison officials, regardless 
of sex orientation. 
13. Petitioner seeks the 1*7-92 disciplinary be expunged from 
his institutional record, and the return £«£ his letter and stamp 
envelope. 
14. Petitioner seeks all reghts to participate in and derive 
any benefits or incur or be relieved of any obligations or have 
such obligations modified or his status changed on account of any 
action or proceeding in vhich he could have participated if 
confined in any appropriate institution of the sending state 
(Arkansas) located vithin the state of Utah. 
15. Any other proper and just relief, including cost and damages 
Petitioner may be entitled to by this Court in the interest of 
justice. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Dinnis P. G^ick 
VERIFICATION 
I, Dennis P. Glick, being first duly sworn under oath 
verify the foregoing Petition For Writ Of Mandamus, to be true 
and correct, and state the same under penalty of perjury (28 U.S.C. 
Sec. 1746) on this ;ty^ - day of h*A?u 1992. 
/L~s. Y.JU. 
Dennis P. G^icK 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAR'.:f 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
DENNIS P. GLICK 
HEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
Plaintiff, ORDER AFFIRMING THE 
MAGISTRATE'S REPORT AND 
-vs- RECOMMENDATION 
JAMES STEWARD, et. al., 
Defendant. Civil No: 93-C-71W 
Plaintiff, Dennis P. Glick ("Glick") is an inmate 
incarcerated in the Utah Department of Corrections, Iron 
County/Utah State Correctional Facility in Cedar City, Utah 
("Cedar City Facility"). Glick filed a Complaint on January 22, 
1993, alleging a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act of 
1871, 42 U.S.C. S 1983. At the same time, Glick submitted a 
motion to proceed in forma pauperis, together with supporting 
affidavits regarding his financial condition. 
Shortly thereafter, this court referred the case to 
United States Magistrate Judge Samuel Alba pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 636. On January 28, 1993, Judge Alba issued a Memorandum & 
Order granting Click's motion to proceed in forma pauperis, but 
directing Click to file an amended complaint that conformed to an 
attached appendix—Directions for Filing Amended Complaint—by 
February 16, 1993. 
On February 16, 1993, Click filed an Amended Complaint 
against defendants James Stewart ("Stewart"}, Lee Hulet 
("Hulet"), Gary Gunter ("Gunter"), Margaret Peterson 
("Peterson"), and an unidentified inmate discipline hearings 
officer ("Unidentified Officer"). Stewart is the Director of the 
Inmate Placement Program of the Cedar City Facility, Hulet is an 
Inmate Discipline Hearings Officer at the Cedar City Facility, 
and Gunter is a Correctional Officer at the Cedar City Facility. 
Peterson is the Management Processes Coordinator of the of the 
Utah Department of Correction ("UDOC"). The unidentified Inmate 
Discipline Hearings Officer is connected with the Utah State 
Prison in Draper, Utah ("Draper Facility"). 
Click alleges that he is a prisoner transferred to Utah 
for incarceration at his request from the Arkansas Department of 
Corrections ("ADOC") pursuant to the Interstate Corrections 
Compact ("ICC"). Am. Compl. at 1. He was initially transferred 
to the Draper Facility, and subsequently was moved to the Cedar 
City Facility. !£,. at 1-2. 
Gllck alleges the defendants violated his civil rights 
by denying him due process and equal protection of lav as 
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the United States 
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Constitution and by .subjecting him to cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of the eighth amendment to the United 
States Constitution. Glick's due process and equal protection 
claims arise out of alleged violations of the provisions of the 
ICC and are detailed in counts 1, 2, 6, 7, and 10 of the Amended 
Complaint. Glick's eighth amendment claims arise out of his 
incarceration in a double-occupancy cell (Counts 3 and 5), an 
alleged deprivation of food for three days (Count 4), an alleged 
unadjudicated punishment (Count 8), and an offensive statement 
allegedly made during a strip search (Count 9). 
On March 30, 1993, Judge Alba issued a Report & 
Recommendation ("R&R") dismissing counts 1-3, and 5-10 of the 
Amended Complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. S 1915(d). R&R at 
2. The R&R does not recommend dismissal of count 4, however, and 
would allow Glick to pursue this claim. 
This court now has made a ££ novo review of the factual 
and legal issues in the Report and Recommendation and, in fact, 
of the entire record. Based on this review, and consistent with 
this Memorandum Decision and Order, the court affirms the R&R as 
to counts 1-2, A, and €-10 of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. 
PISCVSSIPN 
A district court may dismiss a case under 28 U.S.C. 
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S 1915(d) if it is "satisfied that the action is frivolous or 
malicious." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(d) (West 1966). A complaint is 
frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in lav or fact. Neitzke 
v. Williams. 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1987); w»n v. Bellmen. 935 F.2d 
1106, 1109 (10th Cir. 1991). 
A. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS 
Glick objects to the dismissal of his due process and 
equal protection claims because, he claims, the ICC preserves for 
transferred inmates certain "rights" of which he was deprived. 
Objections to Magistrate's R&R at 1-5 (hereinafter "Objections") 
Counts 1, 6, and 10 of the Amended Complaint allege that upon 
transfer from Utah to Arkansas, Click was assigned a prisoner 
classification that was more restrictive than the classification 
he enjoyed while in Arkansas. Am. Compl. at 1-2, 4, 5-7. Counts 
2 and 7 allege Glick was the subject of two disciplinary 
hearings, one at the Draper facility and one at the Cedar City 
Facility, that were conducted solely by UDOC officials, id. at 
2, 4, 6-7. Glick claims he is entitled under the ZCC to receive 
a prisoner classification in Utah that is equivalent to his 
Arkansas prisoner classification and to have ADOC officials 
adjudicate any disciplinary hearings of which he is the subject. 
Objections at 3-5. Click's claims with regard to these counts 
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are frivolous, however, because, even assuming the ICC preserves 
for transferred inmates rights granted by the sending state and 
that the deprivation of those rights requires due process, 
Arkansas law does not grant the "rights" of which Glick was 
allegedly deprived.1 
The ICC was enacted into law by the Utah legislature in 
1982 and codified at Utah Code Annotated sections 77-28a-l. See 
Interstate Corrections Compact Amendments, ch. 38, S I , 1982 Utah 
Laws 165. Arkansas also has adopted the ICC. See Ark. Code Ann. 
SS 12-49-101 to -103 (Michie 1982).2 The ICC recites the desire 
of the party states "to fully utili2e and improve institutional 
facilities and provide adequate programs for the confinement, 
1
 Glick makes no allegations that would support an equal 
protection claim. The claims at issue do not involve a suspect 
class or a fundamental right. See Plvler v. Dog. 457 U.S. 202, 
216-17 (1982). Prisoners do not constitute a suspect class, 
Ruark v. Solano. 928 F.2d 947, 949 (10th Cir. 1991), and, as 
discussed in more detail below, neither the United States 
Constitution or Arkansas law create a right to a particular 
prisoner classification or to have hearings for disciplinary 
violations that occurred in Utah conducted by officials of 
Arkansas. Moreover, at least with regard to counts 1, 2, 6, 7, 
and 10 of the Amended Complaint, Glick complains not that he was 
treated unequally by Utah officials with any specified group, but 
rather that he was treated equally with other prisoners 
incarcerated in Utah prisons. 
3
 Subsequent citations to the ICC will be to the Utah code 
Annotated. 
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treatment and rehabilitation of various types of offenders." 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-28a-l, Art. I (1990). In addition, the ice 
provides that "it is the policy of each of the party states to 
provide such facilities and programs on a basis of co-operation 
with one another, thereby serving the best interests of such 
offenders and of society and effecting economies in capital 
expenditures and operational costs.** id. Furthermore, the ICC 
provides: "The purpose of this Compact is to provide for the 
mutual development and execution of such programs of co-operation 
for the confinement, treatment and rehabilitation of offenders 
with the most economical use of human and material resources.** 
Id. in furtherance of this purpose, the ICC authorizes the party 
states to enter into contracts with each other to provide for the 
confinement of inmates in the receiving state on the behalf of 
the sending state, id. Art. III. 
The threshold question is whether a violation of the 
ICC may give rise to a cause of action under 42 U.8.C.A. 5 1983. 
In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, a 
plaintiff must allege that a person, acting under color of state 
lav, has deprived him of a constitutionally or federally 
protected right. Luaar v. Edmonton Oil Co.. 457 U.S. 922, 930 
(1982). 
A prisoner has no constitutional right to receive a 
particular security classification. Moody v. Paooet. 429 U.S. 
78, 87 n.9 (1976). Similarly, so long as the minimum 
constitutional due process protections appropriate to a prison 
disciplinary hearing are afforded, §£& Wolff v. McDonnell. 418 
U.S. 539, 564-70 (1974), a prisoner has no constitutional right 
to have disciplinary hearings conducted by corrections officials 
of the transferring state rather than those of the incarcerating 
state. 
Even if no federal constitutional right is implicated, 
a plaintiff may assert a claim for relief under section 1983 if 
he is denied, without due process of lav, "liberty interests" 
created by state lav. Kentucky Deot. of Corrections v. Thompson. 
490 U.S. 454, 461 (1989). The ZCC may work in tandem with other 
provisions of Arkansas state lav to create certain liberty 
interests, the deprival of which requires due process.9 
1
 Although the ZCC is facially a matter of state lav, it 
arguably was "transformed" into federal law under the Compact 
Clause of the United States Constitution (the "Compact Clause"), 
U.S. CONST, art. I, S 10, cl. 3, by virtue of Congress's passage 
of the Crime Control Consent Act of 1934 (the "Consent Act"). 
See 4. U.S.C.A. S 112 (West 1985); £ L Cuvler v. Ad»Ffff 449 U.S. 
433 (1981) (holding Interstate Agreement on Detainers was 
transformed into federal law by virtue of Congress's passage of 
the Consent Act). If the ICC was so transformed, a denial of any 
rights granted in the ICC would be a violation of federal law 
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Article IV of the ICC is entitled "Procedures and 
Rights." Utah Code Ann. S 77-28a-l, Art. IV (1990). Under 
article IV, the receiving state acts "solely as the agent for the 
sending state," lflj. Art. IV.(a), and the transferred inmates 
remain subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state. Iflj. 
Art. IV. (c). In its capacity as agent for the sending state, the 
receiving state is required by subsection (d) to provide regular 
reports to the sending state of the inmates transferred to the 
receiving state by the sending state "in order that each inmate 
may have official review of his or her record in determining and 
altering the disposition of said inmate in accordance with the 
sufficient to give rise to a civil rights action under 42 
U.S.C.A. S 1983. Only four courts have reached the issue in 
published opinions, and they are split 2-2. On the one hand, 
Chief Judge Donald E. O'Brien of the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of Iowa in Cameron v. Mills. 645 F. 
Supp. 1119 (S.D. Iowa 1986) (implicitly overruled by Stewart v. 
gc£ajQU£, 924 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1991)) and the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts in Opinion of the Justices to the Senate. 
184 K.E.2d 353 (Mass. 1962), both held that Congress had 
consented to the ICC by passing the Consent Act. On the other 
hand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
in Stewart v. McManus. sjjpxa, and the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Washington in Griffin v. 
Blodoett. 1993 WL 112093 (E.D. Wash. 1993), held that the ICC was 
not within the scope of the Consent Act. The court need not 
resolve this issue, however, because, as explained below, the ICC 
does not grant prisoners a right to maintain a particular 
prisoner classification or to have ADOC officials conduct 
hearings for violations of UDOC disciplinary rules. 
• 
lav which may obtain in the sending state and in order that the 
same may be a source of information for the sending state." Id. 
Art. IV.(d). 
Subsections (e) and (h) of article IV contain broad 
language preserving for transferred inmates rights to which they 
would be entitled if they were incarcerated in the sending state. 
Specifically, subsection (e) provides: 
All inmates who may be confined in an institution 
pursuant to the provision of this Compact shall be 
treated in a reasonable and humane manner and shall be 
treated equally with such similar inmates of the 
receiving state as may be confined in the same 
institution. The fact of confinement in a receiving 
state shall not deprive any inmate so confined of any 
legal rights which said inmate would have had if 
confined in an appropriate institution of the sending 
state. 
id. Art, TV.(e). Subsection (h) provides: 
Any inmate confined pursuant to the terms of this 
Compact shall have any and all rights to participate in 
and derive any benefits or incur or be relieved of any 
obligations or have such obligations modified or his 
status changed on account of any action or proceeding 
in which he could have participated if confined in any 
appropriate institution of the sending state located 
within such state. 
24,. Art. IV. (h). 
In addition, subsection (f) provides: 
Any hearing or hearings to which an inmate confined 
pursuant to this Compact may be entitled by the laws of 
the sending state may be had before the appropriate 
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authorities of the sending state, or of the receiving 
state, if authorized by the sending state. The 
receiving state shall provide adequate facilities for 
such hearings as nay be conducted by the appropriate 
officials of a sending state, In the event such 
hearing or hearings are had before officials of the 
receiving state, the governing law shall be that of the 
sending state and a record of the hearing or hearings 
as prescribed by the sending state shall be nade. said 
record together with any recommendations of the hearing 
officials shall be transmitted forthwith to the 
official or officials before whom the hearing would 
have been had if it had taken place in the sending 
state. In any and all proceedings held pursuant to the 
provisions of this subdivision, the officials of the 
receiving state shall act solely as agents of the 
sending state and no final determination shall be nade 
in any natter except by the appropriate officials of 
the sending state. 
14,. Art. IV. (f). 
With regard to Glick's prisoner classification claims 
in counts 1, 6, and 10, the ICC itself does not grant a 
transferred innate the right to receive the sane classification 
in the receiving state that he received in the sending state. 
However, because article IV. (a) of tha ICC preserves all "legal 
rights" tha transferred innate would have had if ha ware confined 
in an appropriate institution of tha sanding state, Utah Code 
Ann. S 77-2Sa-l, Art. IV (1990); Ark. Coda § 12-49-102, Art. IV, 
it is necessary to determine whether Arkansas statutes or 
regulations grant an inmate a "legal right" to racaiva a 
particular classification. 
10 
A review of the relevant statutes, regulations, and 
caselaw demonstrates that an innate has no legal right to a 
particular classification under Arkansas law. In Ham* v-
Lockhart. 980 F.2d 734 (8th Cir. 1992) (unpublished decision) 
(text in Westlaw), the United States Court ct Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit held that "Arkansas law commits prisoner 
classification to the discretion of prison officials, Ark. Code 
Ann, S 12-29-202(e) (Michie Supp. 1991), and does not protect an 
inmate's right to any particular classification or raise due 
process concerns.** Id. (Westlaw at p.7). See also Strickland v. 
Dver. 628 F. Supp. 180, 181 (E.D. Ark. 1986) (Arkansas law does 
not protect an inmate's right to any particular classification). 
Therefore, Click's claims in counts ' 6, and •' are frivolous 
and are dismissed. 
Glick's claims in counts 2 and 7 of the Amended 
Complaint must likewise fail. Glick bases his claims in counts 2 
and 7 on Article IV, subsection (f) of the ICC. Objections at 3. 
Article IV, subsection (f) only applies, however, to hearings **to 
which an innate confined pursuant to this Compact may be entitled 
by the laws of the sending state.** Utah Code Ann. S 77-28a-l, 
Art. IV(f) (1990). The court's review of the Arkansas statutes 
and of the ADOC's regulations reveal no right to a hearing by 
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ADOC officials for violations of Utah disciplinary rules. 
The court finds it significant that Glick does not 
allege that he was denied any substantive rights or protections 
accorded him by Arkansas statutes or ADOC regulations. He has 
not alleged that he received a type or amount of punishment 
prohibited by Arkansas lav, that he has been punished for an 
activity protected by Arkansas lav, or that he vas denied 
specific due process rights granted him by Arkansas lav. 
St HSffTP MfgroWgFT ClftlHS 
Glick objects to the dismissal of his eighth amendment 
claims contained in counts 3 and 5. Objections at 3-4. Count 3 
alleges that after transfer to the Cedar City Facility, Glick 
submitted a request for single-cell occupancy to the Program 
Specialist, James Kanvill, which vas refused. Am. Compl. at 2. 
Thereafter, Glick alleges, he vas told by an unidentified officer 
to move from a single-man cell to a double-man cell. id. at 2-3. 
Then, according to Glick, the day following the move, Glick 
"explained" the stress problem to an unidentified Sergeant. As a 
result of the "explanation," Glick alleges, he vas moved to a 
single-man punitive cell and informed that he vas on temporary 
lockdovn pending disciplinary action. lit. at 3. Similar to the 
third cause of action, the fifth cause of action alleges that 
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following the lockdown, Click was once again housed with another 
inmate. Id. 
Glick's claims in counts 3 and 5 have an arguable basis 
in law and fact, and, thus, are not frivolous. The eighth 
amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment is 
violated when prison officials demonstrate "deliberate 
indifference to [the] serious medical needs" of patients. 
Estelle v. Gamble. 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Psychological 
disorders may constitute "serious medical needs." White v. 
Farrier. 849 F.2d 322, 325 (8th Cir. 1988); Meriwether v. 
Faulkner. 821 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir.), cert, denied. 484 U.S. 
935 (1987); Bowrino v. Godwin. 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977). 
£££ Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers of Houston. 791 F.2d 
1182, 1187 (5th Cir. 1986); Inmates of Alleaanv County Jail v. 
Pierce. 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979). Because post-traumatic 
stress disorder arguably is a psychological disorder that may 
rise to the level of a "serious medical need," and because 
summary refusal of requests allegedly made to accommodate this 
disorder arguably constitute "deliberate indifference," Glick's 
claims in counts 3 and 5 are net frivolous and may not be 
dismissed under S 1915(d).* 
Click's objections to the dismissal of count 8 of the 
Amended Complaint are, like the count itself, vague and 
con elusory. Count 8 alleges that Click was subjected to 
additional punishment not imposed by Lee Hulet at the Iron County 
disciplinary proceeding. Am. Compl. at 4-5. Click alleges that, 
subsequent to the disciplinary proceeding, his facility privilege 
level was reduced, which resulted in the imposition of an earlier 
lockdovn time than he had previously enjoyed prior to the 
disciplinary proceeding, for a period of 90 days after the 
expiration of the ten-day punitive lockdovn to which he was 
sentenced, id. 
To the extent that count 8 is based on a denial of 
equal protection, that argument was dealt with elsewhere in this 
Memorandum Decision and Order. To the extent that the count is 
based on the eighth amendment, a period of graduated early 
lockdovn imposed following a violation of a disciplinary rule 
does not constitute an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. 
4
 In so stating, the court makes no finding en whether 
post-traumatic stress disorder is in fact a serious medical need, 
whether Glick indeed suffers from such disorder, or whether 
single-cell occupancy is necessary to accommodate such disorder. 
All the court is stating is that counts 3 and 5 may not be 
dismissed as frivolous at this stage of the proceedings. 
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See Whitlev v. Alters. 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). Therefore, 
count 8 is dismissed. 
Finally, Glick objects to the dismissal of count 9 of 
the Amended Complaint. In that count, Glick alleges he was 
denied his eighth amendment rights when forced to endure 
humiliating remarks made by Gunter during a strip search. Am. 
Compl. at 5. Glick alleges officer Gary Gunter and two 
unidentified officers conducted a strip search of Glick and that, 
during the search, Gunter allegedly stated to Glick, "Let's see 
what God made for you." id. Gunter than allegedly instructed 
Glick to lift his scrotum, and stated, "Bend over and spread em.M 
The statements objected to by Glick, though perhaps 
unprofessional, do not amount in this case to a violation of the 
eighth amendment. Count 9 is therefore dismissed. 
Based on the foregoing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. This court affirms the Report and Recommendation 
of Magistrate Judge Alba dated March 30, 1993 as to counts 1, 2, 
6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 and those counts of Click's Amended Complaint 
are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1915(d). 
2. This court also affirms the Report and 
15 
Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Alba dated March 30, 1993, as 
to count 4, which is not dismissed at this time. 
3. This court does not adopt the Report and 
Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Alba dated March 30, 1993, as 
to counts 3 and 5. Counts 3 and 5 are not dismissed at this 
time. 
4. The Clerk of the Court is to issue and serve 
process pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 5 1915(c) and Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 4(c) (B)(i). Defendants need only respond to counts 3, 
'•"*'' to & 
Dated this \1 ^ day of May, 1993. 
David K. Winder 
United States District Judge 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing to the following named 
counsel this /ff- day of May, 1993. 
Dennis P. Glide 
I.C./U.S.C.P. # 5592/21016 
Iron County 
Utah State Correctional Facility 
2136 North Main Street 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
f hw»by e*f%iha» iht tnrrortd document it • ^secretary 
an£ rc*rcst copy of the r*-"—' m f.ie In the otftc*. 
ATTE:T:!~- :.«rr. * 6 
Cicrk.U.S.L : Court . 
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ADDENDUM D 
Alan R. Andersen (A3912) 
Bentley J. Tolk (A6665) 
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE 
185 South State Street, Suite BOO 
P. O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: 532-7840 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS P. GLICK, ] 
Petitioner, 
v. ] 
M. TAMARA HOLDEN, Warden, 
Respondent 
) ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER'S 
1 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I Case No. 920901737 HC 
l Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
On September 27,1993, Dennis P. Glick's ("GlickY) Motion for Summary Judgment and 
M. Tamara Holden's ("Holden's") Motion for Summary Judgment came before this Court 
Appearing for Holden was James H. Beadles, Assistant Attorney General. Alan R. Andersen 
appeared on behalf of Glick. After reviewing the submissions of the parties and hearing oral 
argument, the Court hereby orders that Glick's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and 
that Holden's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. 
As the basis for its ruling, the Court finds that under the Interstate Corrections Compact 
(the "Compact"), Utah officials must act solely as agents for Arkansas with respect to all legal 
i n i r d J u d i c i • •?•••',••••*>. 
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rights, hearings, and proceedings relating to Glick. Utah Code Ann. § 77-28a-l, Art IV(e),(f),(h) 
(1990). The Court also finds that the Compact requires that Glick have all of the legal rights he 
would have if still incarcerated in Arkansas, and that Arkansas law should apply in any bearings 
or proceedings relating to him. gge Gibson v. Morris, 646 P*2d 733, 735 (Utah 1982). 
Furthermore, the reference in the Compact to Glick's "legal rights" includes Arkansas prison 
policies and procedures promulgated pursuant to Arkansas law. 
Accordingly, the Court orders nunc pro tunc the following: 
1. Glick's Utah security classification shall be equivalent in terms of job eligibility, 
custody level, security level, inmate association, housing, and all other aspects to his most recent 
security classification in Arkansas. 
2. Glick's visitation rights shall be equivalent to those applicable to inmates confined 
in Arkansas, including but not limited to the right to have no sex-based distinctions apply to Glick's 
permitted visitors. 
3. Glick's hair, beard, and mustache rights in Utah shall be equivalent to those 
applicable to inmates confined in Arkansas. 
4- The Utah Department of Corrections (the "Department") shall send to Arkansas the 
complete record of each of Glick's disciplinary or other hearings already held in Utah, with the 
request that within thirty days Arkansas officials make the final determination as to whether or how 
such information should be reflected in Glick's prison record and progress reports to Arkansas. 
5. If the Department is unable or unwilling to produce complete transcripts of Glick's 
past hearings, it may either rehear such matters and send transcripts thereof to Arkansas, or simply 
not reflect the alleged disciplinary or other infractions in Glick's prison record or progress reports 
sent to Arkansas. 
6. For any present or future disciplinary or other hearings affecting Glick's status, 
privileges, or record in any way, the Department shall either contact Arkansas officials in advance 
with regard to bow to proceed, or hold a hearing according to Utah procedures, then send the 
transcript to Arkansas for a final determination as provided above. 
7. If the Department is unwilling to: (a) follow the determination of Arkansas officials 
with respect to any matter referenced above; or (b) exclude from Glick's prison record and 
progress reports any alleged infractions for which the Department no longer has transcripts and 
has failed to hold new hearings and submit the results thereof to Arkansas, this Court upon 
petition of the Department shall hold further hearings to resolve the issue. 
8. Although Arkansas remains free to transfer Glick back to Arkansas, and the State 
of Utah remains free to terminate or change the conditions of its contract with Arkansas, the 
Department shall not cause or allow Glick to suffer any retaliation, retribution, punishment, or 
other adverse effects relating to the terms and conditions of his confinement in Utah as a result 
of this action or Order. 
Judgment is hereby entered on behalf of Glick and against Holden. 
ENTERED this 2Z*-~4*v of September, 1993. 
J&/& 
Kenneth'Rigtrup 
District Court Judge 
JAMES H. BEADLES (5250) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondents 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 575-1600 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS P. GLICK, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
M. TAMARA HOLDEN, 
Respondent. 
ORDER GRANTING STAY 
PENDING APPEAL 
Case Ho. 920901737 HC 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
On November 22, 1993, this Court convened a hearing to 
consider respondent's motion to vacate the court's earlier ruling 
granting petitioner's motion-for summary judgment and petition for 
extraordinary relief pursuant to Rule €5B, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Petitioner was represented by appointed counsel, Alan 
Andersen and Bentley Tolk; respondent was represented by James H. 
Beadles, Assistant Attorney General. 
Based on the relevant pleadings and the arguments of counsel, 
this Court denied respondent's motion to vacate. At the conclusion 
of the hearing, this Court sioned an order orantino BeritiAner'e 
motion for summary judgment and his request for relief and 
respondent renewed his request for a stay pending appeal. Pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § ;77-28a-l (1992) (Article IV [e] of the 
Interstate Corrections Compact), this Court stays its order 
granting petitioner's motion for summary judgment and request for 
relief, dated November 22, 1993, pending appeal. 
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CERTIFICATE OF PERSONAL DELIVERY 
I certify that on the Irk day of December 1993, I caused to 
be personally delivered, the original and one true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING STAY PENDING APPEAL to: 
Alan Andersen 
Kimball Parr Crockett & Waddoups 
185 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM E 
Fund Dest. 7\T 
COWTRACT BETWEEN 
THE STATE Of UTAH AND THE STATE Of Arkansas 
FOR THE IMPIEHENTATION Of THE 
INTERSTATE CORRECTIONS COMPACT 
In consideration of the cooperative relationship herewith 
undertaken in the confinement* care* treatment* 9nd rehabilitation of 
inmates on Mr\ interstate basis and in further consideration of services 
to be performed and benefits to be derived by each of the parties hereto 
in the strengthening of their respective correctional programs, the under-
signed states of Utah and Arkansas acting by their duly constituted 
authorities, and pursuant to and to implement the Interstate Corrections 
Compact enacted by each of the parties as follows: 
UTAH Laws of Utah* 1977 
Chapter 235 (Effective 5-10-77) 
Arkansas Act 315* 1073 
Ark. ftSt. Ann. 46-1401 
at. aeq. (Supp. 1977) 
do hereby covenant Bn4 agree as follows: 
I. INTERSTATE CORRECTIONS COHPACT 
The provisions of the Interstate Corrections Compact are hereby 
made an integral part of this contract mnA no provision of this contract shall. 
be construed in any manner inconsistent with said Compact. 
1 . GOVERNING LAV 
Except whore expressly otherwise provided* the laws and admin-
istrative regulations and rules of the sanding state shall govern in eny matter 
relating to an inmate confined pursuant to this contract mt^A the Interstete 
Corrections Compact. 
J. TERHIttOlOCV 
All terms defined In the Interstate Corrections Compact %ni used 
in this contract shall have the same meaning in this contract as in said Compact* 
The terms "sending state" and "receiving state91 shall be construed to include 
and refer to the appropriate official or ageney thereof in each particular 
case. 
4. DURATION 
This contract shall enter into full force and effect on 
March 1. 1978 and shall be automatically r*n**t4 unless 
terminated as provided in paragraph five (5) below. 
5. TERMINATION 
This agreement may be t*rmir*t*6 by notice of either party. 
That termination shall become effective ninety (90) days after receipt of 
said notice. within a reasonable time of receipt of said notice, the sending 
state shall accept delivery of Its inmates at the institution designated by 
the receiving state. 
6. OTHER ARRANGEMENTS UNAffECTEO 
nothing contained in this contract shall be construed to abrogate 
or Impair any agreement or contract for the confinement, rehabilitation or 
treatment of inmates now In effect between the parties to this contract. 
7. HAIL1HC ADDRESSES 
All notices* reports, 9n6 correspondence to the respective states 
to this contract shall be sent to the following: 
UTAH UTAH STATE MISON 
BOX 250 
DRAPER, UTAH 8*020 
A1SUBAS Assistant Director of Institution* 
T. 0. Bos §707 
tine UufX, Arfcaneaa 7161X 
8. EIGHT OF INSPECTION 
The sending stete shall have the right to inspect, at all 
reasonable times, any Institution of the receiving state in winch inmates of 
the sending state ore confined In order to determine If that Institution main* 
tains standards of care and discipline not Incompatible with those of the 
tending state %nd that all Inmates wherein are treated equitably, regardless 
of race", color, religion, creed or national origin. 
•• VACANCIES 
The receiving stete hereby undertakes to make available to the 
tending state such places for inmates as aujy be vacant from time to time in 
eny and all institutions of the receiving state made available for such con-
finement fry the laws of the receiving state. 
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10. APPLICATION 
The sending state will submit a separate application to the 
receiving state for each individual inmate proposed for commitment. 
Said application shall consist of the following: Full in-
formation and all necessary documents relating to the case history, physical 
and clinical record, judicial and administrative rulings Bnd orders relating 
or pertinent to the inmate ^nd the sentence or sentences pursuant to which 
confinement is to be had or to continue, and reasons for the requested transfer. 
Commitment will be deferred until approved by the receiving 
state. 
11. DELIVERY OF IWKATE 
Upon receipt of the acceptance of the application the sending 
State at its expense will deliver the inmate to the institution in the receiving 
State designated by the receiving state, together with the original or a duly 
authenticated copy of his commitment, %nd any other official papers or documents 
authorising detention. Whenever there is to be a mutual exchange of inmates 
between the parties to this contract, the authorities of one of the states may 
act as the agent of the other state for purposes of transferring its inmates 
so that the expenses to both atetes may be minimised. 
12. TRANSFER Of TUMPS 
Funds 4\tt transferred Inmates shall be provided by the sending 
state to be credited to the account of the transferred inmate in the receiving 
state. Upon the r%tum of the inmate'to the sending state, the receiving state 
shall provide funds in the amount due the inmate at the time of return or release 
13. *SSP0HS1BIUTY FOR OFFENDERS CUSTODY 
It shall be the responsibility of the administration of the 
institution In the receiving ftate to confine inmates from e sending state; to 
five them care and treatment including the furnishing the subsistence and all 
necessary medical *n6 hospital services Bn€ supplies; to provide for their 
physical needs; to make available to them the programs of training tnd treatment 
which ere consistent with their individual needs; to retain them in safe custody; 
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that they receive no special privileges *n4 that the sentences and orders 
of the committing court in the sending state %rt faithfully executed. But 
nothing herein contained shall be construed to require the receiving state 
or any of its Institutions to provide treatment, facilities or programs for 
any Inmate confined pursuant to the Interstate Corrections Compact which it 
does not provide for similar Inmates not confined pursuant to said Compact. 
I*. HtPlCAL SCEV1CES 
(a) Inmates from the sending state shall receive such medical, 
psychiatric and dental treatment at may be necessary to safeguard their health 
Bn6 promote their adjustment es self-supporting members of the community upon 
release. Unless en emergency Is Involved, the receiving state shatl contact 
the sending state for advance authority in writing before incurring medical, 
psychiatric, or dental expense for which the sending state is responsible under 
the terms of this contract. In any emergency, the receiving sttte may proceed 
with the necessary treatment without prior authority, but In every such case the 
receiving state shall notify the sending stete immediately %nd furnish full In* 
formation regarding the nature of the illness, the type of treatment to be pro* 
vlded %nd the estimated cost thereof. 
(fe) When medical, psychiatric or dental care of treatment re* 
quires the removal of the inmate from the Institution, the inmate shall be re-
moved only after notification to the sending state. In the event of Mn emergency 
which does not permit prior notification, the institutions shall notify the 
sending state as promptly thereafter as practicable. All necessary precautions 
shall be taken to assure the $&U^kM9pln% of the inmate while he is absent from 
the normal place of confinement., necessary custodial supervision shall be pro* 
vlded by the receiving state. 
(c) Any costs of medical, psychiatric or dental service shall 
be considered normal costs Incidental to the operation of the institution In 
the receiving eute If the service is rmndtr%6 by, steff personnel Bnd In regular 
maintained facilities operated or utlUted by the institution as part of the 
health or correctional program thereof end If the inmate requires no special 
medication, drugs, equipment, anesthetics, surgery or nursing care in addition 
to that commonly available on an Infirmary basts. The cost of any special 
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services, medication, equipment, surgical, or nursing care shall be chargeable 
to the sending state. 
15. TRAINING 0* EMPLOYMENT 
(a) inmates from the sending state shall be afforded the 
opportunity and shall be required to participate in programs of occupational 
training and industrial or other work on the same basis as inmates of the 
receiving state. Compensation in connection with any such participation 
(whether as payment. Incentive, or for any other therapeutic or rehabilitative 
reason) shall be paid to inmates of the sending state on the same basis as to 
inmates of the receiving state. Any such inmates of the sending state shall 
be subject to the regular work discipline imposed upon other inmate participants 
in the particular program. However, nothing contained herein shall be con* 
strued to permit or require any inmate of a sending state to participate in 
training, industrial or other work program contrary to the laws of the sending 
state. 
(b) The receiving state shall have the right to dispose of all 
products produced by an inmate, shall retain all proceeds therefrom, and shall 
bear all costs of said program. 
(c) In the ease of Handicraft or Hobbyeraft programs, the Inmates 
shall h%v the right to dispose of the products of his labor mn6 retain the 
proceeds of any sale of his work in accordance with the rules of the receiving 
state. 
16*. DISCIPLINE 
The receiving state, as agent for the sending state, shall have 
physical control over ^na power to exercise disciplinary authority over all 
inmates from tending states. However, nothing contained herein shall be con-
strued to authorfie or permit the imposition of a type of discipline prohibited 
by the laws of the sanding state. 
17. IAVS M P HE6ULATI0KS 
Inmates while in the custody of the receiving state shall be 
subject to all the provisions of law and regulations applicable to persons 
committed for violations of law of the receiving state not inconsistent with 
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18. RECORDS AND REPORTS TROM RECEIVING STATE 
(a) Within ninety (90) days following the receipt of an 
inmate from the sending state, the receiving state shall furnish an admission 
classification report outlining the Inmate's social background, medical, 
psychiatric, education and vocational findings and Indicating the institutional 
program which has been recommended.. Thereafter, preferably at intervals of 
six months, but at least annually, the receiving state shall furnish the 
sending state a report giving a summary of the inmate's progress and adjustment 
since the last report, including a recommendation for retention or return. All 
such reports shall be forwarded to the sending state. 
(b) The superintendent or other administrative head of an 
institution, in which inmates from sending states Mrt confined, shall keep all 
necessary and pertinent records concerning such inmates in a manner agreed 
between the sending and receiving states. During the inmate's continuance in 
the institution, the sending state shall be entitled to receive, and upon 
request shall be furnished with copies of any such record or records. Upon 
termination of confinement in the institution, the sending state shall receive 
the complete file of the inmate. Sut nothing herein contained shell be con* 
strued to prevent the receiving state or any institution thereof from keeping cop 
of any such record or records upon mr^ after termination of confinement. 
19. KEMOVAL THOU INSTITUTION 
An inmate from the sending stete legally confined in the 
Institutions of the receiving state shall not be removed therefrom by any person 
without an order from the sending state, this subdivision shall not apply to an 
emergency necessitating the Immediate removal of the Inmate for medical, dental 
or psychiatric treatment or other catastrophe or condition presenting imminent 
danger to the safety of the inmate. In the case of any removal for such en 
emergency cause, the receiving state shall Inform the sending stete of the 
whereabouts of the Inmate or inmates so removed at the earliest practicable 
time, Bn6 shall exercise all reasonable care for the safekeeping and custody of 
such Inmate or Inmates. 
20. HEARINGS 
— ..-*_ —* A - i ^ i t AMvida Arffiauete faci l i t ies for 
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any heoring by authorities of the sending state, to which Mn in.»«te nay be 
entitled by the laws of the sending state. Upon the reQuest of the sending 
state, the authorities of the receiving state will be authorized to and will 
condoct any such hearings, prepare end submit the record of said hearings, 
together with any recommendations of the hearing officials, to the officer or 
offictrt of the sending state before whom the hearing would hovt been hid. if 
it h4d taken place In the sending state. 
21. IHTER-INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFERS 
Notwithstanding any provision herein to the contrary, the 
receiving state may tr^ntftr an Inmate from one institution under its control 
to another whenever it deems Such action MppropriBtt. Notice of such transfer 
shall Immediately be sent to the sending state. 
22. ESCAPE 
In case any such inmate shall escape from custody in the receiving 
state, that receiving state will use all reasonable means to recapture the inmate 
The escape shall be reported immediately to the sending state. The receiving 
stete shall have the primary responsibility for and authority to direct the pursu 
and retaking of the Inmate within Its own territory. Any costs in connection 
therewith shall be chargeable to and borne by the receiving state. 
23- DEATH OF 1MKATE 
(a) In the event of the death of an inmate from a sending state, 
the medical examiner, coroner or other official having the duties of such an 
officer In the jurisdiction shall be notified. The sending state shall receive 
copies of any records made at or in connection with such notification. 
(b) The Institution in the receiving state shall immediately 
notify the tending state of the death of an Inmate, furnish Information as 
requested, and follow the Instructions of the sending state with regard to the 
disposition of the body. The body shall not be released except on order of the 
eppropriete officials of the sending state. All expenses relative to any 
necessary preparation of the body and shipment or express charges shall be paid 
by the sending state. The sending mnd receiving states may arrange to have the 
receiving state take **rm of the burial 9n4 alt matters related or incidental 
thereto 9n6 ell such expenses shall be paid by the sendino state. The provision 
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states and shall not affect the liability of any relative or other person for 
the disposition of the deceased or for any expenses connected therewith. 
(c) The sending state shall receive a certified copy of the 
death certificate for any of its inmates who have 4tc6 while in the receiving 
state. 
24. GRATUITIES AND EXPENSES ATTENDANT UPON RELEASE 
The provision of clothing gratuities and any other supplies 
upon release of an inmate shall be at the expense of the sending state and shall 
be in accordance with its laws. 
25. RETAKING OF IHKATES 
The receiving state will deliver any of said imattes to the 
proper officials of the sending state upon demand made to the receiving state 
and presentation of official written authority to receive said inmates. 
The sending state will retake any inmate, upon the request of 
the receiving state, within thirty (30) days after receipt of the request to 
retake. 
In case the commitment under.which any of said inmates is 
terminated for any reason, the fending state agrees to accept delivery of the 
prisoner at the institution of the receiving state, mn6 at its expense return 
him to the jurisdiction of the sending state. 
26. PHOTOGRAPHING AND PUBLICITY 
Institutional or other officials of the receiving state shall not 
be authorised to release publicity concerning inmates from the sending state. 
They shall mot release personal histories or photographs of such inmates or 
Information concerning their arrival or departure or permit reporters or 
photographers to interview or photograph such Inmates. Requests for information 
regarding inmates of sanding states shall be referred to the sending state. 
However, information of public record, such as sentence data or information 
concerning the escape of an inmate may be given directly to the press by the 
receiving state. The receiving state may photograph inmates from the sending 
state as a mean* of identification for official use only. 
27. COST AMD REIMBURSEMENT 
In addition to cost and reimbursement required by other provisions 
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provisions of this contract, the sending state Shalt pay to the receiving 
state for the custody, treatment and rehabilitation of each transferred innvate 
a sum equal to tne individual institution daily cost which is the total of the 
previous fiscal year's operating expense of the institution divided by the 
average daily population of the institution Mnd reduced to a daily cost, except 
that there shall be no reimbursement if there is an equal exchange of prisoners 
between the contracting states, for the duration of the period of exchange. 
The sending state shall be billed quarterly for the cost. 
28- TRANSPORTATION 
Any and all costs of transportation incurred prior to admission 
to an institution in the receiving state, and transportation at the time of, or 
as an incident to release or discharge, conditional or otherwise, shall be 
charged to sending state. 
29. 811UHC AND PAYMENT 
The receiving state will bill the sending state quarterly and 
reimbursement will be made as soon after the receipt of billing as the various 
stata agencies ere able to process the claim. 
30. RESPONSIBILITIES FOR U6AL PROCEEDINGS 
The sending state undertakes to defend any action or proceeding 
involving the custody of any of its Inmates. The receiving state shall be reimbun 
for any expense It may incur in connection therewith. The receiving state 
agrees to ^tfmn^ any action or proceeding erising out of confinement in the 
receiving state or involving employees of the receiving state. 
Jl. INTERNAL RELATIONS 
nothing in this contract shall be construed to affect the 
internal relationships between or among the party states and their subdivisions. 
officers, department or agencies, but each party state undertakes %n6 acknowledges 
1 lability and responsibility for making aach other perty stete whole in respect 
of any obligation imposed upon It by or pursuant to this contract. 
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(N WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned duly authorized officers h«ve 
subscribed their names on behalf of the State of Utah and the State of 
Arkansas 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH STATE W'VISION OF CORRECTIONS 
William V. Hi I liken, 0freetor 
STATE OF ARKANSAS 
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION 
«tmiKtbry, 01 rector V 
Contract between the Utah State Department of Social Services, 
Corrections 
State of' Arkansas 
and 
Contract Term; ' 3/1/78 - Temlnation 
APPROVED: 
Department of S o d a ! Services 
A. W. Mitchell. Ph.D;, Exec. Dir. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Robert^BT^ansen, Attorney General 
Contract #_ 
Date &/£?/?f 
Date 
APPROVED AS TO AVAILABILITY OF FUilDS": 
WaJM* £^&**r->v. ^ %'?-•?>r 
Budget Officer 
APPROVED: 
MEMORANDUM: 3/22/78 
JO: CORKECTIONS 
SUBJECT: Approved Contract 
State Contract No. 78 B73S 
Enclosed ere two copies of the above numbered contract between your aoency end 
State of Arkansas 
Please retain one copy of this contract for your files and forward one copy to the 
other party to the contract 
Metvtn Jt£ Owens, Director 
Administrative Services 
MMO/AEA 
End oi 
^ Scott M. Matht»nf Governor, State of Utth 
Anthony W. Mitchell. PhD.. £»cutivt Director Social Services>v - -—-^'M;-
" IMS I 1978$) ^ 
MEMORANDUM ^ ^ r S ^ . 0 " DATE: 2/23/78 
TO: Anthony W. Mitchell, Ph.D., Executive Director 
= W. 
WAR 03 137j FROM /^X^Melvin M. OwensTDirector, Administrative Services 
SUBJECT: CONTRACT • Transmittal and Summary „ , „ . . , . 
^ WflECTOfl OF FINANCE 
Enclosed for your approval and transmittal to the Attorney General and State 
Finance Department, are 3 copies of a contract as described below: 
SUMMARY 
RECEIVED OAS 1121121. 
DATE 
STATE FINANCE # 
73"8735 
Contract Principals: Corrective 
State of Arkansas 
B New Contract O Renewal D Amendment * 
Contract Period: ?A 1078 *n Termination 107 
Contract Amount: S A« « » ^ 
Department Stiff Reviews 
A Comments: 
Bureau of Fiannc 
Contract rwwr giss-^^ 
PURPOSE: Interstate Corrections Compact 
«AR 1 h978 
«•!/•> XAJmmt U A M * t T M M k ClttftA * 
